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Abstract:  
Law enforcement is decentralized. It is so despite documented interjurisdictional 
externalities which would justify its centralization. To explain this fact, we construct a 
political economy model of law enforcement. Under decentralization, law 
enforcement in each region is in accord with the preferences of regional citizens, but 
interjurisdictional externalities are neglected. Under centralization, law enforcement 
for all regions is chosen by a legislature of regional representatives which may take 
externalities into account. However, the majority rule applies for decisions made by 
the central legislature and this implies that the allocation of enforcement resources 
may be skewed in favour of those who belong to the required majority. We show that 
the choice between centralization and decentralization depends on the technology of 
law enforcement and the nature of the interjurisdictional externalities. 
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1 Introduction
In several countries, a significant portion of law enforcement is undertaken at the local level. As
reported in Table 1, in Canada, 57% of expenditures on police protection were made at the local
level in 2005, and 60.4% of police forces worked at that same level in 2006. For the USA, the
numbers in Table 2 point to even more decentralization. Indeed, in 2003, 64.6% of expenditures
on police protection were made at the local level and 76.5% of police forces worked at that level.
Why such an arrangement? Why is police protection, and more generally law enforcement, left in
the hands of local authorities? Given that the decentralization of law enforcement is not without
problems, this phenomenon certainly requires an explanation.
– TABLE 1 HERE –
– TABLE 2 HERE –
When law enforcement increases, criminals may react in a variety of manners. Of course, criminals
may simply decide not to commit a crime, which is the ideal outcome from the perspective of
the authorities. But things are unfortunately not so simple and criminals can also adapt to new
circumstances. For instance, when increased enforcement takes place at a specific time (e.g. curfew),
criminals may decide to operate at a different time, a phenomenon labeled temporal displacement.1
Criminals may also change target, method, and type of crime. More importantly for us, when
increased enforcement is targeted at a specific area, criminals may decide to operate in a different
location, a phenomenon labeled spatial displacement, which is in fact a standard negative externality.
The nature and the size of spatial displacement is debated among criminologists, but many believe
it has to be taken into account in the design of law enforcement policies.2 On the other hand, some
criminologists argue that the benefits of enforcement in a specific location may actually diffuse to
nearby locations in which criminality is reduced.3 In such case, the externality of enforcement would
be positive.
In our analysis, there are two regions which may undertake law enforcement. We remain agnostic
as to whether law enforcement entails spatial displacement or diffusion of its benefits, from one region
to the other. Both possibilities are allowed for in our modeling. However, we note that provided
law enforcement entails displacement or diffusion, then it is likely that there would be benefits to
its centralization as a central authority could internalize negative – spatial displacement – and
positive – diffusion of benefits – externalities between regions. Of course, the internalization of
1Jacob et al. (2004) argue that in the short run, there is substantial displacement of crime over time.
2 See Bowers and Johnson (2003) for an interesting discussion of the issues.
3For example, see Weisburd et al.(2006).
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externalities would justify centralization if governments behaved as benevolent dictators and were
allowed to set differentiated levels of enforcement for each region.
In Oates (1972), two key arguments in favour of decentralization are put forward. The first one is
the preference-matching argument according to which regional governments are better at selecting
policies that reflect the preferences of regional citizens. In Oates (1972), this is because central
governments are viewed has being unable to set differentiated policies for different regions. Because
they choose uniform policies for all regions, these policies simply do not reflect regional tastes. More
recently, the preference-matching argument has been re-formulated by Besley and Coate (2003).
Besley and Coate allow central governments to select different policies for different regions, but
the ill-functioning of central legislatures, which choose policies for all regions, creates a mismatch
between policies and regional tastes. Thus, because of a political failure at the central government
level, policies chosen by regional governments are more likely to reflect the preferences of regional
citizens.4 The second argument in favour of decentralization is that it leads to more accountability
– less rent-seeking– of elected officials.5 In this paper, the accountability argument is left aside
and our focus is on the preference-matching benefits of the decentralization of law enforcement,
which has to be traded-off against the benefits associated with the internalization of externalities
under centralization.
There is a growing literature that analyzes enforcement externalities between individuals.6 But
to our knowledge, the literature on the enforcement externalities between adjacent jurisdictions is
more limited. Marceau (1997), Marceau and Mongrain (2007), Newlon (2001), and Teichman (2005)
are the few analyzes that take into account the spatial displacement of crime between jurisdictions.
However, none of them provide an explanation for the decentralization of law enforcement to local
governments, an arrangement which makes it more likely for crime displacement to take place. The
current paper provides such an explanation by adapting the Besley and Coate (2003) framework to
a world with crime. Hence, a political economy model of two regions is built in which law enforce-
ment can be left in the hands of a central government, or decentralized to regional governments.
The nature of crime in this world is such that both displacement and diffusion between regions
may occur. Governments are elected. In particular, central government policies are decided in a
legislature composed of elected regional representatives, a simple majority of those representatives
being required for a policy to be adopted. The majority rule in the central legislature makes possible
4A verification of this argument is found in Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee (2002). In the USA, following the lifting
of alcohol prohibition in 1933, the States became responsible for liquor control. Some States chose to keep control
liquor at the state level, while others chose to decentralize it at the county level. Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee show
that the States that chose to decentralize liquor control were those that were more heterogenous in terms of preferences
for liquor control at the county level.
5 See Hindriks and Lockwood (2005) for a recent theoretical analysis of political accountability.
6 Interesting examples include Glaeser et al. (1996), Hotte and Van Ypersele (2003), Kling et al. (2005), and
Shavell (1991).
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the exploitation of a region outside of the majority. As will be seen, this possibility is the main
weakness of centralization.7 On the other hand, no such problem will plague regional legislatures,
but as already discussed, regional legislatures will neglect externalities and this will lead to an in-
adequate allocation of resources. Eventually, we are able to ascertain the conditions under which a
society, at some initial constitutional stage, would make the choice of centralizing or decentralizing
law enforcement. As the analysis shows, this depends on the technology of law enforcement, and in
particular, on the relative size of the parameters reflecting displacement and diffusion.
This paper is organized as follows. In next section, we lay out the basic two-region model, and
in particular, the technology of law enforcement. Section 3 examines the first best law enforcement
policies that would be chosen by a benevolent dictator. In Section 4, we examine the choice of
law enforcement by elected governments under decentralization, while in Section 5, we turn to
the choice of law enforcement policies by a central government in which decisions are made by
a legislature of elected regional representatives. The constitutional stage in which citizens choose
between centralization and decentralization is examined in Section 6. This choice is shown to depend
on the relative size of the parameters reflecting displacement and diffusion in the law enforcement
technology. Our concluding remarks follow.
2 The Model
The economy is divided into two distinct regions indexed by i ∈ {1, 2} . Under decentralization, there
is a legislature in each region, while under centralization, there is a unique central legislature. Each
region has a continuum of citizens of unit mass, so total population in the economy is of measure
2. Each citizen is endowed with some private income x, with x distributed over the [x, x] interval.
The mean income in region i is denoted by mi, and we assume that this also equals median income.
In each region, a proportion of the income of each voter is robbed by criminals. This proportion is
equal to the number of criminals operating in region i and is denoted by ci. Therefore the amount of
income that is left for consumption for an individual of type x is (1− ci)x. The number of criminals
in region i depends on the level of enforcement in the two regions, denoted by αi for i = {1, 2}. We
assume an increasing marginal cost of enforcement. Specifically, we assume that to achieve a level
of enforcement αi in region i, it costs α2i /2. We also assume that a head tax (i.e. equal lump-sum
tax) can be imposed on voters to finance expenditures in enforcement. Under decentralization, the
level of enforcement αi in region i is chosen by the legislature of region i, and the cost is borne by
the voters of region i only. Since there is a unit mass of voters in region i, each voter bears a cost
α2i /2. Under centralization, the central legislature makes the choice of enforcement levels (α1,α2)
7On the functioning of legislatures, see also Ferejohn et al. (1987) and Lockwood (2002).
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for the two jurisdictions. The cost of achieving (α1,α2) is then borne equally by the voters of the
two regions so that each voter has to bear a cost of (1/2)[
¡
α21/2
¢
+
¡
α22/2
¢
] = (α21 + α
2
2)/4.
Under decentralization, assuming region i has chosen enforcement level αi, the welfare of a voter
with income x living in region i is given by
Wi = (1− ci)x−
1
2
α2i (1)
As for the situation under centralization, assuming enforcement levels αi and αj for region i and
region j, respectively, the welfare of a voter with income x living in region i is given by
Wi = (1− ci)x−
1
4
(α2i + α
2
j ) (2)
We assume that the number of criminals operating in each region depends on the level of enforcement
in both regions. We specifically assume:
ci (αi,αj) =
1
2
[1− a1α1 − a2α2]− γi [αi − αj ] ; i 6= j. (3)
In this expression, γi ≥ 0 is a parameter reflecting displacement which can also be interpreted as a
mobility cost for criminals. When γi = 0, mobility costs are infinite, no displacement occurs, and
the two regions have half of the total number of criminals operating on their territory. If, however,
γi > 0, there is displacement and the number of criminals operating in region i is decreasing in
the difference between the levels of enforcement in the two regions. In addition, the total number
of criminals who operate in the two regions depends negatively on the levels of enforcement of the
two regions, as happens when there is diffusion. The diffusion parameter ai ≥ 0 can be interpreted
as a measure of the efficiency of the technology in deterring criminal activities. It could reflect the
occupational choice of individuals who must choose between honest work and a criminal life, the
return of the latter being reduced when any of the regions invest in enforcement. In what follows,
we assume, for simplicity, that a1 = a2 = a and that γ1 = γ2 = γ. Therefore, from now on, γ is the
displacement parameter and a is the diffusion parameter.
In this paper, one of our objective is to characterize the choice of enforcement of adjacent regions
when decisions are made by elected governments (legislatures). We also would like to understand
why it is commonly observed that crime enforcement is decentralized. Our characterization and our
answer will be obtained by studying a three-stage game which can be described as follows.
1. Constitutional stage. Citizens in each of the two regions decide, by majority voting, whether
decisions on crime enforcement are to be decentralized (i.e. left in the hands of regional
legislatures) or centralized (i.e. made by a central legislature).
2. Choice of representatives.
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• Under Decentralization: Citizens in each region elect a representative to their regional
legislature.
• Under Centralization: Citizens in each region elect a representative to the central legis-
lature.
3. Choice of enforcement levels.
• Under Decentralization: The representative in each regional legislature simultaneously
choose the level of enforcement for their region.
• Under Centralization: The two representatives in the central legislature choose the levels
of enforcement for the two regions.
In what follows, after examining the choices of a benevolent central government dictator, our
benchmark, we will examine the last two stages of the above described games in which decision are
either made by citizens or by elected representatives. We will examine these last two stages under
decentralization in Section 4 and under centralization in Section 5. The constitutional stage will
then be examined in Section 6, anticipating the results of Section 4 and 5.
3 The First Best Benchmark: Benevolent Central Govern-
ment
As our benchmark, we consider a benevolent central government dictator who can and will internalize
the externalities and accommodate differences in incomes by imposing differentiated policies in each
region. The first best levels of enforcement can be obtained by maximizing a utilitarian welfare
function given by the sum of the voters’ individual welfare or, given the assumed risk neutrality,
by the sum of the mean voters’ individual welfare, i.e. fW = W (m1) + W (m2). For heuristic
reasons, we assume that the sum of the costs of enforcement is borne equally by the voters of the
two regions, i.e. each voter bears a cost (α21+α
2
2)/4, as in equation (2) above. Note that because of
risk neutrality, the manner in which these costs are shared has obviously no impact on the optimal
choice of (α1,α2) by a benevolent central government.
The first-order conditions are given by:
− ∂c1
∂α1
m1 −
∂c2
∂α1
m2 = α1, (4)
− ∂c1
∂α2
m1 −
∂c2
∂α2
m2 = α2
We obtain
eα1 = [0, 5a+ γ]m1 + [0, 5a− γ]m2, (5)
eα2 = [0, 5a− γ]m1 + [0, 5a+ γ]m2.
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If we compare eα1 and eα2, we find that
eα1 >=
<
eα2 as m1 >=
<
m2. (6)
In other words, the optimal level of enforcement is higher in the richer region. Observe also that
when a ≥ 2γ, both eα1 and eα2 are strictly positive independently of m1 and m2. Suppose now that
a < 2γ and that, for example, m1 > m2. In this case, eα1 is strictly positive and eα2 is also strictly
positive if and only if m1/m2 < (γ + 0.5a) / (γ − 0.5a). Hence, a benevolent central government
optimally invests in deterrence activities in both regions if the median wealth asymmetry is not too
strong, otherwise he/she does not invest in the poorer region (providing that negative investment
is not possible). In this paper, we will assume throughout that if a < 2γ and mi > mj then
mi/mj < (γ + 0.5a) / (γ − 0.5a) which implies that the first best levels of investment in deterrence
activities both in the richer and in the poorer regions are strictly positive.
In addition, the equilibrium numbers of criminals in the two regions are
c1 (eα1, eα2) = 1
2
£
1− a2 (m1 +m2)
¤
− 2γ2 (m1 −m2) , (7)
c1 (eα1, eα2) = 1
2
£
1− a2 (m1 +m2)
¤
− 2γ2 (m2 −m1) .
Assume that region 1 is richer than region 2, i.e. m1 > m2. In this case, c1 < c2, i.e. the number
of criminals who operate in region 1 is lower than that in region 2. This is because the marginal
benefit of enforcement is larger in the richer region than in the poorer region whereas the marginal
cost is independent of regions’ wealth. Hence, it is optimal to invest more in enforcement in region
1 than in region 2 which in turn implies a lower number of criminals in region 1.
We now turn to the determination of welfare levels under optimal policies. The welfare of region
i when first best policies are in place is
Wi = [1− ci (eα1, eα2)]mi − [eα1]2 + [eα2]2
4
(8)
We then find
fW1 = £0, 5 + a2 (m1 +m2) + 2γ2 (m1 −m2)¤m1 (9)
−1
4
£¡
0, 5a2 + 2γ2
¢ ¡
m21 +m
2
2
¢
+
¡
a2 − 4γ2
¢
m1m2
¤
,fW2 = £0, 5 + a2 (m1 +m2) + 2γ2 (m2 −m1)¤m2
−1
4
£¡
0, 5a2 + 2γ2
¢ ¡
m21 +m
2
2
¢
+
¡
a2 − 4γ2
¢
m1m2
¤
.
Welfare is higher for the richer region than for the poorer one for two reasons. First, more wealth
directly translates into more welfare. Second, the richer region benefits from a larger level of
enforcement and a lower crime rate than the poorer region, while it pays only for the average
cost of enforcement in the two regions.
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Having established our benchmark, we now turn to the analysis of the last two stages of our three-
stage game with citizens and representatives as decision-makers. We first consider decentralization.
4 Decentralization with Elected Governments
Under decentralization, the choice of enforcement in region i is made by its regional legislature. This
regional legislature is assumed to be composed of a single representative chosen by and amongst the
voters of the region. More precisely, to determine who is to serve we use the citizen-candidate model
of representative democracy due to Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996).
Thus, we have a two-stage policy game to solve. In the first stage, voters in each region elect a
representative by majority rule. In the second stage, the representatives in each regional legislature
simultaneously choose the level of enforcement for their region.
4.1 Enforcement Levels
As usual, we work backward. Let the types of the elected representatives in region 1 and 2 be x1
and x2, respectively. Each representative then decides the optimal level of enforcement given the
other representative’s policy choice. For the representative of region i, the first-order condition is
− ∂ci
∂αi
xi − αi = 0 (10)
We can solve for the Nash equilibrium and obtain
αi(xi) = [0, 5a+ γ]xi (11)
This equilibrium level is increasing in xi, a and γ. The equilibrium number of criminals in region i
is then
ci (αi,αj) =
1
2
[1− a (0, 5a+ γ) (x1 + x2)]− γ (0, 5a+ γ) (xi − xj) ; i 6= j (12)
Hence, in a decentralized equilibrium, if the representative of region i is richer than that of region
j, then the level of enforcement is higher in region i than in region j, which in turn induces a lower
number of criminals in region i.
4.2 Choice of Representatives
We now turn to the election stage. Citizens, in each region, vote simultaneously to elect their
representatives to their regional legislature. A political equilibrium is such that given the identity
of the representative of the other region, the domestic representative is preferred by a majority of
the domestic voters. The solution of this majority voting problem is given by the median voter
theorem, i.e. the elected representative that is most preferred by the voter with the median income
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mi in each region. This is because the difference in welfare between citizens in a region is linear in
income. Hence, single-peakedness holds.
The payoff of region i’s median voter with income mi, given representatives (xi, xj) is given by
WDmi (mi, xi, xj) = {0, 5 + (0, 5a+ γ) [0, 5a (x1 + x2) + γ (xi − xj)]}mi − 0, 5 (0, 5a+ γ)2 x2i ; i 6= j
(13)
The optimal representative type xi for the median voter in region i is therefore given by the solution
to
∂WDmi (mi, xi, xj)
∂xi
= 0⇔ (0, 5a+ γ)2 (mi − xi) = 0 (14)
which is independent of xj . In equilibrium, we then have xi = mi for i ∈ {1, 2}. Thus, we have
Lemma 1 : Under a decentralized system, the median voter in each region prefers a representative
of his own type. The equilibrium level of enforcement, under decentralization, is then given for
i ∈ {1, 2} by
αDi (mi) = [0, 5a+ γ]mi. (15)
It is interesting to compare these levels with the first best optimal levels given in equation (5)
eαi >=
<
αDi (mi) as a
>
=
<
2γ. (16)
Therefore when a is high enough relative to γ, the diffusion externality dominates the displacement
externality and there is under-deterrence (with respect to the optimal level) in the Nash equilibrium.
If, however, γ is relatively strong, there is too much enforcement in a decentralized equilibrium. This
is because with strong displacement potential, each region tries to invest more than the other to
export its criminals.
The decentralized equilibrium payoff of a voter with income x living in region i is then given by
WD
i
(x) = {0, 5 + (0, 5a+ γ) [0, 5a (m1 +m2) + γ (mi −mj)]}x− 0, 5 (0, 5a+ γ)2m2i ; i 6= j.
(17)
Recall that by assumption, there is a continuum of citizens of mass of unity in each region and that
the median of the income distribution also corresponds to its mean. Hence, the payoff of region i’s
median voter also represents aggregate welfare. Aggregate welfare in region i is thus given by
WDi (mi) =
h
0, 5 + 0, 5 (0, 5a+ γ)2mi +
¡
0, 25a2 − γ2
¢
mj
i
mi; i 6= j. (18)
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5 Centralization with an Elected Government à la Besley
and Coate
Under centralization, the policy outcome is also determined by a two-stage policy game. In the first
stage, citizens in each region elect their representative to the central legislature. In the second stage,
the two representatives in the central legislature choose the level of enforcement for each region. To
model this policy stage, we follow Besley and Coate (2003) and in particular, the minimum winning
coalition approach. Under this view, a policy is adopted by the central legislature when a minimal
number of its members support the policy. We assume that the minimum size of the coalition
required to “win a vote” is 50% of the members of the central legislature. Thus, given the central
legislature has two members, each representative can be thought of as a minimum winning coalition.
Therefore, it is assumed that each region’s representative forms the minimum winning coalition and
chooses policy with a probability of 1/2. In other words, enforcement levels (α1,α2) are chosen by
the representative of region 1 with probability 1/2, and by that of region 2 with the same probability.
5.1 Enforcement Levels
We first determine the outcome of the policy stage. Let the types of the elected representatives in
region 1 and 2 be x1 and x2. Since the costs of enforcement are equally shared, the optimal level of
enforcement for region i’s representative is obtained by maximizing
Wi = (1− ci)xi −
α21 + α
2
2
4
(19)
with respect to α1 and α2. We assume that the representative of region i cannot choose a negative
level of enforcement for region j. Hence, we impose a positivity constraint αi ≥ 0 for i = {1, 2}.
Let the levels of enforcement chosen by a representative of type xi of region i be denoted by α1 (xi)
and α2 (xi). The first-order conditions characterizing these levels of enforcement are
∙
1
2
a+ γ
¸
xi −
1
2
αi (xi) = 0 (20)
∙
1
2
a− γ
¸
xi −
1
2
αj (xi) = 0, i 6= j.
Solving this system, we find
αi (xi) = [a+ 2γ]xi (21)
αj (xi) =
½
[a− 2γ]xi, i 6= j, if a ≥ 2γ,
0, if a < 2γ.
We thus have αi (xi) > αj (xi) irrespective of the level of income of representative xi. In addition,
if the diffusion parameter a is low relative to the displacement parameter γ, then the elected rep-
resentative will invest in enforcement only in his/her region. If, however, the diffusion parameter
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is relatively high, the elected representative will optimally invest in the two regions because of the
convexity of the cost of enforcement functions. We thus need to consider two cases, depending on
whether or not a is greater than 2γ. Abusing notation, we denote by cj(xi) ≡ cj (αi (xi) ,αj (xi)) the
equilibrium number of criminals in region j when representative xi of region i chooses the levels of
enforcement. Using the equilibrium levels of enforcement in equation (21), we obtain the following
equilibrium number of criminals
If a ≥ 2γ
⎧
⎨
⎩
ci (xi) = 0, 5− a2xi − 4γ2xi
cj (xi) = 0, 5− a2xi + 4γ2xi, i 6= j
(22)
If a < 2γ
⎧
⎨
⎩
ci (xi) = 0, 5− 0, 5 (a+ 2γ)2 xi
cj (xi) = 0, 5− 0, 5
¡
a2 − 4γ2
¢
xi, i 6= j.
Observe that in both cases, we have ci (xi) < cj (xi). In other words, elected representatives always
spend more in enforcement in their region of origin than in the other region, and this translates into
the number of criminals in their region of origin being smaller than that in the other region.
5.2 Choice of Representatives
We now turn to the election stage. If the representatives are of types x1 and x2, the policy outcome
in the second stage of the game will be (α1 (x1) ,α2 (x1)) with probability 1/2, and (α1 (x2) ,α2 (x2))
with probability 1/2. In the first stage, a political equilibrium is such that given the identity of
the representative of the other region, the domestic representative is preferred by a majority of the
domestic voters. Because of the linearity of individual welfare in x, the majority rule equilibrium
coincides with the decision that is optimal for the median voter.
When the representatives in the central legislature are of type xi and xj , region i’s median voter
mi has the following expected payoff function
WCmi (mi, xi, xj) =
1
2
"
(1− ci (xi))mi −
αi (xi)
2 + αj (xi)
2
4
#
(23)
+
1
2
"
(1− ci (xj))mi −
αi (xj)
2
+ αj (xj)
2
4
#
; i 6= j.
The most preferred representative of region i’s median voter mi is given by
If a ≥ 2γ :
∂WCmi (mi, xi, xj)
∂xi
= 0⇔ 1
2
¡
a2 + 4γ2
¢
(mi − xi) = 0, (24)
If a < 2γ :
∂WCmi (mi, xi, xj)
∂xi
= 0⇔ 1
4
(a+ 2γ)2 (mi − xi) = 0.
In equilibrium, independently of xj , we have xi = mi, for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Lemma 2 : Under a centralized system with a non-cooperative legislature, the median voter in each
12
region prefers a representative of his own type. Region i’s median voter has a probability 1/2 of
being the decision-maker for the two regions in which case the equilibrium levels of enforcement are
αCi (mi) = [a+ 2γ]mi, (25)
αCj (mi) =
½
[a− 2γ]mi, i 6= j if a ≥ 2γ
0 if a < 2γ.
We can compare these equilibrium levels with the first best optimal levels of enforcement given in
equation (5). First consider the equilibrium choice of enforcement by a representative for his/her
region of origin.
αCi (mi)
>
=
<
eαi as mi
mj
>
=
<
0, 5a− γ
0, 5a+ γ
. (26)
When a < 2γ, region i’s representative will spend too much in enforcement in his/her region of
origin relative to the optimal level independently of mi and mj . When a ≥ 2γ, this will be also the
case if region i is richer than region j. Further, even if a ≥ 2γ and region i is poorer than region j
(mi < mj), region i’s representative may spend too much in enforcement in his/her region of origin,
although the reverse is also possible.
Consider now the equilibrium choice of enforcement by a representative of region i for region j.
αCj (mi)
>
=
<
eαj as mi
mj
>
=
<
0, 5a+ γ
0, 5a− γ if a ≥ 2γ, (27)
αCj (mi) < eαj if a < 2γ.
Again, the comparison depends on the relative size of all parameters mi, mj , a and γ. More
precisely, when a ≥ 2γ, region i’s representative is likely to choose, for region j, a lower level of
investment than the optimal level except if he/she is significantly more wealthier than region j’s
representative. When a < 2γ, region i’s representative does not invest in the other region whether
he/she is wealthier or poorer than region j’s representative and so, there is under-investment in
region j with respect to the optimal level. (Recall that we assumed mi/mj < (γ + 0.5a) / (γ − 0.5a)
when a < 2γ and mi > mj , which implies that eαj > 0).
We can also compare equilibrium enforcement under centralization and decentralization. The
following can be observed
αCi (mi) = 2α
D
i (mi) , (28)
αCj (mi)
>
=
<
αDj (mj) as
mi
mj
>
=
<
0, 5a+ γ
2 (0, 5a− γ) if a ≥ 2γ,
αCj (mi) < α
D
j (mj) if a < 2γ.
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In words, if region i’s median voter is the decision maker under centralization, he will choose a
higher level of enforcement at home than under decentralization and in most cases, a lower level
for the other region than that the other region would have chosen under decentralization (except if
region i’s representative is much more wealthier than region j’s representative and a ≥ 2γ).
The expected level of welfare of a voter with income x in region i under a centralized system is
then
If a ≥ 2γ : WCi (x) =
1
2
£
1 + a2 (m1 +m2) + 4γ2 (mi −mj)
¤
x
−1
4
¡
a2 + 4γ2
¢ ¡
m21 +m
2
2
¢
; i 6= j, (29)
If a < 2γ : WCi (x) =
1
2
h
1 + 0, 5 (a+ 2γ)2mi + 0, 5
¡
a2 − 4γ2
¢
mj
i
x
−1
8
(a+ 2γ)2
¡
m21 +m
2
2
¢
; i 6= j.
Finally, the expected level of welfare for region i’s median voter, hence aggregate welfare in region
i, can be computed as follows
If a ≥ 2γ : WCi (mi) = 0, 5mi +
¡
0, 25a2 + γ2
¢ ¡
m2i −m2j
¢
+
¡
0, 5a2 − 2γ2
¢
m1m2; i 6= j,
If a < 2γ : WCi (mi) = 0, 5mi + 0, 125 (a+ 2γ)
2 ¡
m2i −m2j
¢
+ 0, 25
¡
a2 − 4γ2
¢
m1m2; i 6= j(30)
6 Constitutional Stage: Centralization or Decentralization
Suppose now that voters in the two regions have to decide on the best manner to deal with crimi-
nality. As is understood from previous sections, the technology of crime and crime enforcement can
be described by parameters (a, γ). In practice, there are many types of crimes and associated crime
enforcement, and they can be described by various combinations of the technological parameters.
Suppose for now that all crime is of specific type (a, γ). Given this, we now wish to determine which
system, between centralization and decentralization, would actually be chosen by voters to fight this
specific type of crime. Thus, suppose that prior to the two-stage games (choice of representatives
and choice of enforcement) described and analyzed in previous sections, voters in each region can
decide in an initial constitutional stage, by majority voting, whether or not the regions should agree
to a centralized system. We assume that for centralization to occur, it must be supported by a ma-
jority of voters in both regions. Focusing on subgame perfect equilibria, we now analyze the initial
constitutional stage of this game, anticipating the outcomes of the subsequent two-stage games.
To determine the outcome of this constitutional stage, we need a measure, for each voter, of
the difference in welfare under centralized and decentralized policy-making. Let ∆i (x,mi,mj) ≡
WCi (x,mi,mj)−WDi (x,mi,mj) be that measure for a voter with income x in region i. Hence, this
voter will vote for centralization (decentralization) if and only if ∆i (x,mi,mj) is positive (negative).
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In addition, in what follows, we need to make a distinction between a < 2γ and a ≥ 2γ since this
crucially affects the outcomes of the subsequent stages. Actually, this distinction parallels the
difference between over-deterrence (a < 2γ) and under-deterrence (a ≥ 2γ) with respect to the first
best levels, when decisions are decentralized (see equation (16)). We first consider the simplest case,
i.e. a < 2γ.
6.1 General Case With a < 2γ (Low Diffusion, High Displacement)
Recall that in this case and under centralized policy-making, the central legislature of elected rep-
resentatives will invest in enforcement activities only in the region that belongs to the minimum
winning coalition. There is no investment in such activities in the other region. In this case, the
welfare difference between centralization and decentralization, with the use of equations (17) and
(29), is given for i =∈ {1, 2} by:
∆i (x,m1,m2) = −0, 125 (a+ 2γ)2m2j , i 6= j.
We then have the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 : When a < 2γ, a majority of voters in both regions vote for decentralization
irrespective of the asymmetry in median wealth between the two regions.
In this situation, i.e. for any a < 2γ, there is always unanimity for decentralization. The reason is
that under a centralized system, each region has a probability 1/2 of getting all the criminals since
with probability 1/2 the representative of the other region is chosen as the agenda-setter, in which
case, he will only invest in enforcement at home (see Lemma 2).
6.2 General Case With a ≥ 2γ (High Diffusion, Low Displacement)
In this case and using equations (17) and (29), the welfare difference between centralization and
decentralization is given for i =∈ {1, 2} by:
∆i (x,m1,m2) = (0, 5a− γ) [0, 5a (m1 +m2)− γ (mi −mj)]x (31)
−
¡
0, 25a2 + γ2
¢
m2j − 0, 5 (0, 5a− γ)
2m2i , i 6= j.
Observe that these expressions are monotonically increasing in x. Because the coefficient of x
differs in the two expressions, there must be a exi corresponding to the income type of the voter
who is indifferent between centralization and decentralization in region i. Thus, exi is such that
∆i (x,m1,m2) = 0. Clearly, all voters x in region i with x ≥ exi prefer centralization to decentraliza-
tion. Because single-peakedness holds, it must then be that a majority of voters in region i prefer
centralization if and only if exi ≤ mi. We then have the following Lemma
15
Lemma 3 : Under majority voting, centralization will occur in equilibrium if and only if exi ≤ mi
for i = {1, 2} with
exi = (0, 5a− γ)2m2i + ¡0, 5a2 + 2γ2¢m2j
(a− 2γ) [0, 5a (m1 +m2)− γ (mi −mj)]
; i 6= j. (32)
Before analyzing the outcome of the constitutional stage for any (a, γ), we first consider particular
cases to better understand the effects at work.
6.2.1 Case With No Displacement (γ = 0) and Heterogenous Regions
Consider the case in which a > 0 and γ = 0 so that a > 2γ obviously holds. Assuming m1 6= m2
and using (33), we have
exi = m2i + 2m2j
2 (mi +mj)
; i 6= j. (33)
In region i, all individuals with x ≥ exi vote for centralization while individuals with x < exi vote for
decentralization. Observe also that exi depend only on m1 and m2 (and then do not depend on a).
We then have the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 : Assume no displacement occurs, i.e. γ = 0. Then, for any a > 0, centralization
will occur in equilibrium if and only if the median income of the richer region is not larger than£
1 +
√
3
¤
/2 the median income of the poorer region.
According to Lemma 3, centralization will occur in equilibrium if and only if both exi ≤ mi for
i = {1, 2}. Using (34), this inequality reduces to (mj −mi) (mi +mj) ≤ mj (2mi −mj). Assume
region 2 is the richer region, i.e. m2 > m1. In this case ex2 ≤ m2 is obviously verified. To determine
under which condition the inequality ex1 ≤ m1 is satisfied let m2 = κm1 with κ > 1. With this
notation, the above inequality reduces to 2κ2 − 2κ − 1 ≤ 0. It is immediately checked that this
inequality is indeed negative for any κ > 1 if and only κ ≤
£
1 +
√
3
¤
/2.
Put another way, a majority a voters in both regions will vote for centralization if and only if
the difference in median wealth between the two regions is relatively small. When criminals cannot
move from one region to the other, there is only one inter-regional externality stemming from
local investment in deterrence activities. Policy centralization allows to internalize the diffusion
externality but each median voter has only a probability 1/2 of being the policy-maker. Since the
cost of law enforcement is shared equally between the two regions, a majority of voters vote for
centralization in the two regions if and only if the asymmetry in wealth between the two regions is
not too strong relative to the benefits of internalizing the diffusion externality.
16
If however, the difference in median wealth between the two regions is strong, decentralization
will prevail. Suppose, for example, that in region 1, the distribution of wealth is skewed with most
individuals having little or almost no wealth (i.e. m1 is close to 0). In this case, we have
lim
m1→0
ex1 = m2, (34)
lim
m1→0
ex2 = m2
2
.
In this case, a majority of voters in region 2 will vote for centralization while a majority of voters
in region 1 vote for decentralization (since m1 ≪ m2). So in equilibrium, centralization will not
take place. This is because under decentralization, the level of enforcement in region 1 is almost
equal to 0 (since most individuals are already very poor), while under centralized policy-making,
this region has a probability 1/2 of not being the agenda-setter in which case it will have to pay
1/2 of the level of enforcement that is preferred by the median voter of the other region (who is
actually much more wealthier). Voters in region 1 are afraid of this possibility and they therefore
vote against centralization.
6.2.2 Case With Displacement γ 6= 0 and Homogenous Regions (m1 = m2)
We now examine the case in which γ 6= 0 (but a ≥ 2γ) and we impose homogenous regions so that
m1 = m2 = m. Using (33), ex the income of the voter who is indifferent in both regions between
centralized and decentralized policy-making is given by
ex = £3a2 + 12γ2 − 4aγ¤m
4a (a− 2γ) . (35)
The derivative of ex with respect to a is given by
∂ex
∂a
=
£
12γ2 (γ − a)− a2
¤
m
2 [a (a− 2γ)]2
< 0. (36)
Therefore, a higher a (i.e. a higher diffusion effect of law enforcement) translates into a voter who is
indifferent between centralized and decentralized policy-making with a lower income and, therefore,
into a higher proportion of voters who prefer a centralized system (provided that a ≥ 2γ). When
the parameter reflecting diffusion goes to infinity, we have ex = (3/4)m. In that case, all voters with
income higher than 3/4 of the median income prefer a centralized system and therefore a majority
of individuals in both regions will vote for centralized policy-making. On the other extreme, when
a = 2γ, ex goes to infinity and all voters in both regions prefer a decentralized system.
Similarly, the derivative of ex with respect to γ is given by
∂ex
∂γ
=
£
12γ (a− γ) + a2
¤
m
2a (a− 2γ)2
> 0. (37)
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Therefore, a higher γ (i.e. more potential for displacement) translates into a voter who is indifferent
between centralized and decentralized policy-making with a higher income and, therefore, into a
higher proportion of voters who prefer a decentralized system (provided that γ ∈ [0; a/2]). When
the displacement parameter goes to zero, we have again ex = (3/4)m and so all voters with income
higher than 3/4 of the median income prefer a centralized system and therefore a majority of
individuals in both regions will vote for centralized policy-making. At the other extreme, when
γ = a/2, ex goes to infinity and all voters in both regions prefer a decentralized system.
To summarize, the lower the spatial displacement effect and the higher the diffusion effect of law
enforcement, the higher the proportion of voters that will vote for centralization. Following Lemma
3, centralization will occur in equilibrium if and only if ex ≤ m with ex given by (36). This inequality
reduces to 12γ2 + 4aγ − a2 ≤ 0. We can thus establish the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 : Suppose that a > 2γ and that the two median voters are equally wealthy, i.e.
m1 = m2 = m, then a majority of voters in both regions will vote for centralization (respectively
decentralization) if and only if a ≥ ea (γ) (respectively a < ea (γ)) with ea (γ) = 6γ.
This result obtains because under a centralized system, each region’s representative has a probability
one half of not being the decision-maker. In that situation, the other region’s representative overin-
vests in his/her region and underinvests in enforcement in the other. As the diffusion effect of law
enforcement increases, this policy is less detrimental for the region that is not the decision-maker.
This induces the two regions to prefer a centralized system. If, however, the diffusion effect is low
relative to the displacement effect of law enforcement (i.e. γ is relatively large), both regions will
vote for decentralization. Note that the case in which γ is large is precisely that in which the exter-
nality due to the mobility of criminals is large and in which a well-functioning central government
would prove useful.
6.2.3 Different Types of Crimes
We now turn to the most general case when a ≥ 2γ > 0. According to Lemma 3, centralization
will occur in equilibrium if and only if a majority of voters in both regions vote for centralization,
i.e. if and only if exi ≤ mi for i = {1, 2} with exi given by (33). The two inequalities reduce to
a ≥ ea1 (γ,m1,m2) and a ≥ ea2 (γ,m1,m2) with ea1 (γ,m1,m2) and ea2 (γ,m1,m2) given by
ea1 (γ,m1,m2) = γ
h
2m21 + 5, 66m2
p
m21 − 0, 5m22
i
m21 + 2m1m2 − 2m22
, (38)
ea2 (γ,m1,m2) = γ
h
2m22 + 5, 66m1
p
m22 − 0, 5m21
i
m22 + 2m1m2 − 2m21
.
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Suppose now that region 1 is poorer than region 2, i.e. m2 > m1. If we denote m2 = km1 with
k > 1, the above expressions can be written as follows
ea1(γ, k) = γ
h
2 + 5, 66k
p
1− 0, 5k2
i
1 + 2k − 2k2 , (39)
ea2(γ, k) = γ
h
2k2 + 5, 66
p
k2 − 0, 5
i
k2 + 2k − 2 .
Observe first that both expressions are linear with respect to γ. Second, ea2(γ, k) is strictly positive
for any k > 1 and ea1(γ, k) is also strictly positive if and only if 1 + 2k − 2k2 > 0. If however,
1 + 2k − 2k2 < 0, then ea1(γ, k) < 0 and ex1 > m1 for any couple (a, γ). In this case, a majority
of voters in region 1 vote for decentralization irrespective of the technology of crime enforcement.
Therefore, there exists a threshold value of the parameter reflecting the diffusion externality above
(below) which centralization (decentralization) is preferred by a majority of voters in region 1 if and
only if 1 + 2k − 2k2 > 0 or k <
£
1 +
√
3
¤
/2.8
Furthermore, calculating the derivative of ea1(γ, k) with respect to k yields
∂ea1(γ, k)
∂k
=
γ
h
4 (2k − 1) + 5.66
¡
1− 0.5k2
¢−1/2 ¡
1 + k2 − k3
¢i
[1 + 2k − 2k2]2
. (40)
Since 1+k2−k3 > 0 for any k <
£
1 +
√
3
¤
/2, this derivative is unambiguously positive. Calculating
the derivative of ea1(γ, k) with respect to k yields
∂ea2(γ, k)
∂k
= −
γ
h
4k (2− k) + 5.66
¡
k2 − 0.5
¢−1/2 ¡
k3 + k − 1
¢i
[k2 + 2k − 2]2
. (41)
This derivative is unambiguously negative for any k <
£
1 +
√
3
¤
/2. Since ea1(γ, k) = ea2(γ, k) when
k = 1, we can conclude that ea1(γ, k) ≥ ea2(γ, k) for any k ∈ £1; £1 +√3¤/2£. Then, a majority of
voters in both regions will vote for centralization if and only if a > ea1(γ, k) ≥ ea2(γ, k). The analysis
above is summarized as Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 : Suppose that a > 2γ > 0 and that m2 = km1 with k > 1, then
(i) If the median wealth asymmetry is relatively strong, i.e. if k >
£
1 +
√
3
¤
/2, a majority of voters
in the poorer region vote for decentralization irrespective of the levels of the diffusion effect and
displacement effect of law enforcement given by (a, γ) and so, decentralization occurs in equilibrium.
8The term in √ in the denominator of ea1(γ, k) must also be positive in order to have a real positive number. This
is the case for any k <
h
1 +
√
3
i
/2 <
√
2.
19
(ii) If the median wealth asymmetry is not too strong, i.e. if k <
£
1 +
√
3
¤
/2, then centralization
occurs in equilibrium if and only if a majority of voters in the poorer region vote for centralization,
i.e. if and only if a ≥ ea1 (γ, k) with ea1 (γ, k) given by (40), otherwise decentralization occurs. The
threshold value of the diffusion effect ea1 (γ, k) is increasing both in γ and in k and so, the greater the
displacement effect of law enforcement (the greater γ) or the greater the median wealth asymmetry
(the greater k), the less likely centralization will occur in equilibrium.
Observe that the critical value of the median wealth asymmetry above which decentralization is
always preferred by a majority of voters in the poorer region is identical to that obtained when there
is no displacement effect, i.e. when γ = 0 (see Proposition 2). However, in contrast with the case of
no displacement, a value of k below this critical level is not sufficient to yield centralization of law
enforcement as an equilibrium outcome when γ > 0. Indeed, with k <
£
1 +
√
3
¤
/2, centralization
is preferred by a majority of voters in the poorer region, and in turn in the richer region, if and
only if the diffusion effect relative to the displacement effect of law enforcement is sufficiently large,
i.e. if and only if a ≥ ea1 (γ, k). If, however, ea2 (γ, k) ≤ a ≤ ea1 (γ, k) or a ≤ ea2 (γ, k), a majority
of voters in the poorer region or in both regions prefer decentralization to centralization so that, in
equilibrium, decentralization occurs.
To better understand Proposition 4, note that the decision-maker, under centralization, chooses
a level of enforcement in deterrence activities for both regions that is increasing in a. However, the
decision-maker chooses a level of enforcement that is skewed towards his/her own region and, in
addition, that is increasing in γ at home and decreasing in γ abroad (see equation (25)). Hence,
the greater a relative to γ, the less detrimental is the centralized system for the region whose
representative is not the decision-maker. If a is sufficiently large, a majority of voters in both
regions then vote for centralization so as to internalize the positive externality of law enforcement. If,
however, a is not sufficiently large relative to γ, then one region or both prefer decentralization since
a relative high mobility of criminals exacerbates the selfishness of the minimum winning coalition.
Furthermore, the poorer region is more disadvantaged than the richer region when its representative
is outside the winning coalition. The reason is that the cost of law enforcement is equally shared
between the two regions. Therefore, individuals in the poorer region are less likely to vote for
centralization than those in the richer region. Actually, the greater the median wealth asymmetry
is, the stronger the opposition at the constitutional stage between the individuals of the two regions
and the less likely centralization will occur.
We can summarize, for various combinations of (a, γ), the choice of each region between central-
ization and decentralization with the help of Figure 1.
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– FIGURE 1 HERE –
In Figure 1, because m2 > m1, the locus ea1(γ, k) lies above the locus ea2(γ, k), which itself lies above
the locus a = 2γ, since we assumed a ≥ 2γ. The set of parameters (a, γ) for which centralization is
preferred is larger for region 2 than for region 1. As centralization occurs only if both regions agree,
it follows that centralization of enforcement will only be accepted at the constitutional stage for
crimes with (a, γ) that belong to the region above the ea1(γ, k). As explained above, for values of a
that are large relative to γ, centralization is preferred by a majority of voters in both regions while
the reverse holds for values of a that are low relative to γ. For intermediate values of a (relative
to γ), centralization is preferred by a majority of voters in the region 2, but decentralization is
preferred by a majority of voters in region 1. In this last case, decentralization is the equilibrium.
Thus, our prediction is that at the constitutional stage, centralization of enforcement will occur only
for crimes which entail a relatively high level of diffusion and a relatively low level of displacement.
7 Conclusion
A feature of crime enforcement (in particular for property crime) is that it is typically decentral-
ized. This is despite the fact that there are interjurisdictional externalities which would justify the
centralization of crime enforcement if governments were benevolent. However, if decisions are made
by a legislature of locally elected representatives, as is typically the case in centralized systems,
centralization has also a drawback. This is because the minimum wining coalition of representa-
tives may distort policies in its favor and against the members outside the majority. Hence, when
voting over the (de)centralization issue, voters in each region trade-off the economic benefits of in-
ternalizing externalities and the political costs of being outside the majority of the legislature with
positive probability. The political choice of centralized and decentralized law enforcement crucially
depends on the extent of the externalities. For example, if the negative - spatial displacement -
externality is sufficiently large relative to the positive - diffusion of benefits - externality, a majority
of voters in both regions vote for decentralization irrespective of the respective wealths of the two
regions. Centralization, however, may occur in equilibrium only if both the parameter reflecting the
displacement effect and the asymmetry in median wealth between the two regions are sufficiently
low.
These results provide reasons why law enforcement is more often decentralized than we would
expect. Of course, this is very much a first step in understanding the question of the decentralization
versus centralization of law enforcement from a political economy perspective. A limitation of our
analysis is that we have restricted our analysis to the extreme cases where law enforcement is either
fully centralized or fully decentralized. In reality, both centralized and decentralized governments
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invests in law enforcement, even though more investments in deterrence activities is undertaken at
the local level than at the central level. Another limitation of our analysis is that we have assumed
that there is a political failure at the central level but not at the local level. However, in general,
the process of decision-making at the local level is also subject to political conflicts between several
elected local representatives. These considerations require an analysis more subtle than the one
developed in this paper in order to improve our understanding of the institutional aspects of law
enforcement from a political economy perspective.
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Table 1:
Police Protection Expenditure and Employment by Level of Government, Canada
Local government Provincial Government Federal government Total
Expenditure, 2005 5 298 2 092 1 891 9 282
[millions of CAN $] (57.0%) (22.6%) (20.4%) (100%)
Employment, 2006 36 739 9 336 14 791 60 866
(60.4%) (15.3%) (24.3%) (100%)
Source: Statistics Canada (2006), “Police Resources in Canada, 2006”, by Julie Reitano, Minister
of Industry, Catalogue No 85-225-XIF, November.
Table 2:
Police Protection Expenditure and Employment by Level of Government, USA
Local government State Government Federal government Total
Expenditure, 2003 57 503 11 144 20 422 89 069
[millions of US $] (64.6%) (12.5%) (22.9%) (100%)
Employment, 2003 856 396 105 933 156 607 1 118 936
(76.5%) (9.5%) (14.0%) (100%)
Source: U.S. Department of Justice (2006), “Justice Expenditure and Employment in the United
States, 2003”, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Office of Justice Programs, NCJ 212260, April.
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Figure 1: The choice between centralization (C) and decentralization (D)
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